and to J>ICSCIIt to tire pulilW illipoltauit economic ia ts awl their iliterprctatiitn iii a scientific and impartial nianner. The Board 01 I)iiccoi s is charged with the responsibility of eusul-ing that he woik of lie Iliii-cao is -ai-ried on iii strict coflførnii 1% Wit Ii tII 15 OI)jcct
To this end the Roaid of l)irectors shall appoint onc oi-mole I)ircuois of Research. 'the l)irccior or l)ii'cctois of Research shi:ill stiliiiiii to the IlicilIlleis of (lie Boat-el, or to its Exccuttve (:oliilliittcc, loi their lotitial adopioii all SPC(ifi( lroposals ( Oliterllilig rest-arches to lie just t itted.
No ICl)Oit shah be pitlilislied until the I)iiectot or l)itectors ol Rcse;ilTli shall have submitted to the Board a siiiitiutarv drawitig atteiltion to the chaiacicr of the data and their utilization in the report. the liaitli-e and treatilient ot he problems involved, he lila iii conclusions and such other itiforniat ion as iii i lid opinion woiil<l serve to determine the sit itabihitv nI t lie icpoi t for l)ltiihi -(atioti iii accol'(laii(e with (lie pi lie ih)li's of tIre Bureau, . topv tif ally lnalliisu-ipi )uuposed lot pubhicatiort shall also lie stilnititted to eat h mciii her of the Boa ul. For each ma liriscript to he so submit te(h a spec Ia I omuhi Etee shall lie appoiil ted li the l'i-esideiit, or at his ulesignat ion by t lie Execut ire 1)irector, iinsistiiig of thi icc Di rCt mrs selected .us iicai I' as milas lie one Ironi cacti geneial division iii clue Board. Ilie ilailies of the special lisatlitscript couimittce shall he statc(l to eiuclt l)iic trir iihieii (lie si:mmal v and report ulesçriberl iii p;iragrapli (I) ate sent to hint. It shall be (lie (juts of each ntctiilicr 01 the Coi)Ilmiit(ee to i-tail ihie maliilscri1)i. Ii ear Ii iiicuthui-of the special cotitmit (cc signifies his appio-cal wit hut (liii r das a. the Imiantiw ripm may lie pulllished. Il each ilieinbei 01 the special ((illlitiittec has tIOt signified hits approval wi dii o tlt irt v dt a 01 t lie t mansinitta I of he report and matitiscript, (lie t)im eUni of Reseiudi shall then homily each titcitihici uI the Itijarel, ietmestilig approval dappiiis.i prtuiiutiolt. and thirt additional days shall be giaitted lot I his pu Ipose. I he ,tlaiiitst ril)m slia II then iiot he published ritiless at least a tiiajorirs of the etitirc Boatd and a ss'o-(hirds htiajoritv (if those tuetulicis of the Board who shall have vol t'tl on t lie 1)1 oposal within t lie time fixed for the meceipt of votcs on t he pu lii itimt Loll pi-oposed shall have approved.
6 No tltalittscripl Iiia lie 1)111)1 olied. though appi-oa'cd by-each mew her of the special ((umiiilitce. until hums 'usc (lays have elapsed fioni (he traiisniittal of the sutlioutary and i('l)uiit. hue ititersiul is allowed or die tescipt (ii :nur lIleni oraniltini 01 dissent ni lead-vat jolt, loget hiet us'it It a brief statduileim I of It is reasons, that any memlser may wish to cxpmess', and such nicmoraiidiunt of dissent or reserva(ion shall lie pu hI ishied wit It the manuscript if lie so theatres. i'iililit alion does not, however, imply that each ineniber of tile Board has read the ntanuscl'tpt . or (hat either meniliers of the Board in getieral or of t lie special committee, have passed upon its validity ill every detail.
7. A copy of this resoluitioti shall, trnles,s otherwise determined by the Board. be printed in each copy of every National Bureau hook.
(Resolu,!uun adopted October 25. 1926, and revised Fbruamy6, and February 24, 1q11) Relation of the I )ii'c'lors 10 ihc Work of the National Bureau ol Econoni k Research ACKNOWLEDGMENTS IT Is a privilege for the itithors to (xpress their tl)lflCciatu)Ii U) all hose who have con ti-iJ)uted to the completion of this study either by furnishini us with (litta, l)\ ollering technical suggest ions and criticisms, or 1w facilitating publication. A complete list of those who Coiltril)uted to the development of the study would he a long one ;ndeed, going hak to the staff and advisors of the (01poratc Bond Project and inclu(ling the many investment analysts and students of finance who have generously consented to read and (OlufliClit on the manuscript. We want to CXf)CSS Out appreciation generally to all of these and specifically to acknowledge with gratitude the (Otitril)t!tions of the Iohlowing \V. Briiddock Hickman and Eliiabethi Simpson hate 1cii iiii)st (OOpCrati'c iii iiiaking available to the authors the wealth of iiilormatioii contained iii the files of the Corporate Bond Project. fliev coinl)ilc(l the data and did most of the analysis necessary For the selection of basic corporate bond yields foi i 9j'. and they also provided niuch of the (ha ta 1ISC(l for later years. Moreover, I)i. Hickman's writings and curreii t researches on the tetin structure of interest rates have con tributetl greatly to our general al)l)roa(hi to the l)rol)lelit of measuring the pattern of l)asic iclds. \iIiliCl(l \'. RicHer of the Inst ittiti' for -dvanced Study, who has been actively interested in the basic yield concept since its inception an(l who wntril)tiic(l greatly to its origination and (Icvclopmciit . has given us invaluable technical aid as well as the support of a never flagging interest iii our labors. l)i-. Ralph A. \oung. now Assistaii l)ircctoi of the I)ivision of Reseat-eli and Statistics of the Hoard of Govei'nors ol the Federal Reserve System and formerly Director of die N.ttiiiiiai Biii-cttis Financial l&eseardi Program, encouraged us to tIn(lertake the work and helped at cver-point in its early development. Di-. Young's successor at the National Bureau, I)r. R. J. Satilnier, has been eqtiallv sympathetic in making available to us the facilities necessary for the conduct oF the studs' and has given us the benefit of his advice on many of its aspects. R. A. Mot-ton, of the Blue List Publishing-Conipanv, has generously prosided us with most of our pm-inlarv itifomiim:utioii 1)11 nittiticipal bonds. l)oi-othv \rc.scott, who e(hited the first version of the mansiscript, NanCy l'cmkins, srho edited the stibsequent versions. H. Irving Forman, who drew the charts. ao (l Mildred Courtney. who supervised the production of this and earlier veisunis, have all made iiivaliiablc coiitrihniiomms fm which we are (leeplv giateftil. First Quarter, 1940 , 1946 , a'id 1947 8 Frequency Distribution of 8-Il \'ear Corporate Boiid by \'k'Id Differentials, First Quarter, 1940 , 1946 , and 1917 9 Frequency I)isti-ibution of 2l-3() Year Corporate Bonds b Yield Differentials, First Quarter, 19-10, 1946, and 1917 bonds outstanding in the first quarter of each year, and a series of basic yield curves was derived to measurc the yields and ternis to maturity of these bonds. Therefore, in addition to Se1'Ving as a standard of comparison, these basic yield curves have contributed to our knowledge of the relation between yield and maturity in the corporate market. Although the curves themselves attempt to measure the relationship between yield and maturity at a given imioment of time, they have enabled us to construct series showing the yearly changes in yields for the highest-grade bonds of any specified maturity and to point out shifts in this yieldmaturity relationship. These year-to-year movements of tile basic yields, it has been observed, are somewhat less subject to fluctuations than most series of bond yields. On the whole, high grade bond yields are distinctly less sensitive to 'arjatjoiis in )WSS confidence than low grade bond yields. Although yields of all grades of bonds arc essential to a C0I1i})rChensive of the money markets, basic yields are Particularly uSClu! whenever it is desirable to minimize the effects of variations in quality and risk. For example, the substantial decline in Corporate l)Ofld yields that occurred from about 1 940 to i 946 did not represent a cledine in interest rates so much as a rise in average bond (1uality and an increase in general business confidence. As a result o wartime prosperity, the credf jositions of many obligors improved greatly, interest paymnents were resumed on clef aulted bonds, and middle grade issues often attained the status of money bonds. Consequently, the changes in yields of the various grades of bonds in the market were far from uniform. While most of the lower grade issues were declining rapidly in yield, the highest grades, as measured by the basic yield, were almost unaffected.
At the turn of the century the corporate bond market occupied such a dominant position in American finance that the student of long-and medium-term interest rates would necessarily have devoted most, if not all, of his energies to the measurement of corporate bond yields. And he might even have restricted his attention to railroad bonds, the most important single class of securities within the Corporate market. His task, furthermore, was made fairly easy by the general characteristics of the market. Since it was the dominant market, volume was large and trading was well organized, and quotations were systematically recorded nd easily obtained. Although bonds varied considerably in quality, there was an adequate representation of the higher grades, which could be fairly readily identified -a process that became even easier a few years later with the advent of Moody's ratings. Bonds also varied in maturity, from a month or so to a hundred years, and occasionally longer, but this wide range posed no serious problems of analysis because of the insignificant variation in yield with term to maturity. For 1900 and several years after, almost any simple average of high grade bond yields, was sufficient to measure long-and medium-term interest rates with reasonable precision.
Since I 900 the picture has radically changed, and the Americami money markets have become far more complex. Within the corporate market, railroad bonds have lost their former doniiiiant position, as utility and industrial bonds have become more prominent. The call feature seems to have increased in importance; at the present time virtually all corporate bonds issued are callable at a small premium, high grade bonds frequently sell above call price, and the exercise of the call provision is a common occurrence. Finally, the corporate bond market, like all other bond markets, has come to differentiate between longand shori-terin l)onds so that a single series of average yields is inadequate to describe the entire market. But the most revolutionary developments have occurred outside the corporate bond market. These include (i) the rise of the federal debt in World \'Var I; (2) the rise in state and municipal debt in the decade following World War I; () the rise in income tax rates, which has put tax-exempt securities in a preferred position; and () the phenomenal rise in the federal debt during the great depression and World War II, which brought the United States government bond market to a position of pre-eminence. Unlike 1900, when the bond market was almost exclusively a corporate market, there are today at least three important bond markets, each having its own distinctive characteristics. Therefore, the student of interest rates today needs several series of high grade bond yields. He needs one series for tax-exempt state and municipal bonds, he needs another for the taxable corporates, and he may riced two or three for Treasury bonds, which are now differentiated by tax provisions, eligibility for bank investment, and other considerations. Furthermore, in each of these three markets yields vary appreciably with term to maturil:y, and a completely satisfactory series must therefore include yields for several different maturities.
The purpose of the present study is to present a detailed description of the basic yields for corporate, municipal, and Treasury bonds in the first quarter of each year from i to 1947, to compare the three yield structures, and to examine changes in the pattern of yields from year to year.2 A less detaile(l analysis of the pattern ol basic yields from i 926 to for selected maturities in the three principal sectors of the bond market is also presented. This stud supplements and brings to date the study of basic corporate bond yields. 1900-I q42. published by the National Bureau in i 942,a in which 1)asic corporate bond yields were preseined for the first quarter of each year of the period analvied and some comparison was made between these yields and Ircasurv 1)011(1 ','iel(IS.
The Definition 01 Basic Yields .-\s indicated above, the basic yield is defined as the yield of the highest grade bonds of given mat urity free from xtraneous influences.4 Since the moSt practical (1] tenon of quality for this analysis was current mnai-ket appraisal, bon(ls with the lowest market yieI(ls were ordinarily assumed to be those of the highest quality. OF course, the analysis was rcstricte(l to bon(IS with high quality ratings, audi a considerable effort was made to eliminate all bonds with low yields that may have been attributed to the operation of some special feature, such as a ConverSion privilege or an active program of debt rctircmcnt, 1 lowever, no attempt was macic to justify quality by subsequent market performance. Practically speaking then, the basic yield is the lowest limit of yields ÜCIUa1/y attained in the market by high grade bonds of a given maturity (111(1 a given class. While the yields of a number of bonds approach the basic yield, the yields of only a few actually reach it.
The problem of relating yield to maturity is met by constructing continuous yield-maturity curves depicting the yields of the highest grade bonds of all maturities from the shortest to the longest. Perhaps the most widely used yield-maturity curves are those published currently by the Treasury l)epartment.a
Corporate Bond Yields
The basic yields of corporate bonds were derived from the market prices of an extensive list of high grade bonds, including virtually all the high grade issues traded oti the New York Stock Exchange and the New York Curb Exchange, as well as an appreciable representation of the high grade issues traded exclusively in over-the-counter markets and on out-of-town cxchaiiges. The original list of high grade bonds was compiled from the records of the Corporate Bond Project. This list has been kept current and has been supl)lemeflted through reviews of the records of high gra(ie bond offerings and of bonds listed on the exchanges. Some small, inactive issues may have been omitted unintentionally, but they are of little uriportance in this study because of the uncertainty and unreliability of their rice quotations. Other issues were deliberately omit ted because of convertibility provisions, active sinking funds, or other special features that unduly influenced the yield. Although another bond provision, the call feature, has had a considerable effect upon bond yields, particularly (luring the few years, callable bonds as a group were not excluded from the sample. Foi-the rears 1900-1933, bonds actually selling above call price were excluded, but for the years 1934-47, this practice was not feasible because in this later period so many of the high grade bonds were selling above call price. Since the expectation of early call tends to keep the price down and the yield up, the basic yields are subject to an upward bias in such & See, for example, Trea5urv Bulletin.
6 Since the 1942 study, p. 8 II., gives complete (lescription of the niethod liv which the basic iehk are determined and the yiel(l-mattiritv striictu,-e is Constructed oik-.1 brief outline of the luetilOd is presented here.
See footnote I.
4 years as i 9q and i fD, when nu)st high gTa(le bonds were selling above (all f)ri('e. 1-lowever, the basic yield is less affected by this bias than a general average ol bond yields because the basic yield is (Icterimned from the lowest, yielding b()fl(1S.
For eadi boiid analyzed an average jwice for the first quarter of the year was computed from the high and low prices in January, February, and March, and from this average price thc yield to maturity was cornpittel. Each bond was then plotted as one point on a scatter chart, on which the horizontal axis rcprcsdntc(l years to maturity and the vertical axis represented yield. The basic yield curve was then drawn freehand to describe the relation between yield and maturity for the lowest yielding bonds, which arc rcsitmai1y the highest grade. The process is illustrated in Chart i , which shows the scatter (hagram and the basic yield curve for corporate bonds for the first quarter of 1946. Ii will he noted that an occasional bond yield lalls below the hued curve, whereas in some maturity ranges the curve lies well below the lowest yields. It was felt that a smoothing l)ro(ess was essential. Occasionally an isolated bond yields less than all other bonds in the same maturity, and although we were unable to attribute this directly to some clearly extraneous factor there is always a chance that some such factor may have been at work. Consequently, the basic yield curves were drawn through the lowest points of concentration rather than the lowest individual yields. Since many Illaturity ranges contain no points of concentration, some sort of interpolation was necessary, and this was achieved by the USC of smooth curves.8 All the basic curves in both the 1942 and the present stud \re1-c drawn as simply as possible, and they all conform to one of four simple types. In the 1942 study, covering the years i 900-1942, one of the following three types was found to give a satisfactory fit: (i) a horizontal straight line, () a curve rising at a declining rate until it approaches a horizontal straight line, or () a curve falling at a declining rate until it approaches a horizontal straight line. In this study a lourth type is found to give a better fit For the years 1944-47 -a curve rising ai the short-tcrni end at a constant rate (a rising straight line), and then rising at a declining rate until it approaches a horizontal line.
S Iii roost riwl ing these freehand curves. grea pa ins were taken to iniake I hem smooth. This was done by the process of dillercncing. .'t tier t tic piel inn nary curves were drawin, values along the curves were tabulated and successive dillerences were obtained. Adjnistineniis of the curves were made until the successive differences (sometimes second or lhir(l iltifereinucs were aiia1vied bec-anie sufficiently regular.
It is rc'aIi7c(t that thIs process way have resulted in Os cc-suioot lung. However, t Inc alternative was to fit the curves to the lowest ol,scrvcd yields inn ca Ii maturity range. and it was I cit that I he cirocs of uisder-smoouli big 1w this method were mole serious thain tlnmt' oF over-sninol lung. For hurtlier discussiuni of this l)r01)lenn see Dnnranid, 'i/n. cii.. pp. 10.12.
CHART In principle the basic municipal bond yield is analogous to the basic corporate yield, being defined as the yield of the highest grade municipal bonds free from extraneous influences, or the lowest limit actually attained by municipal boiids of a given maturity. In practice, however, the process of fitting the basic municipal curves has (liufered somewhat from that used for the corporates.
The pre'aIence of serial issues in the municipal market offers some great advantages for research. While the corporate analysis necessarily had to cover the bonds of a large number of obligors, the municipal analysis could be limited to a small number of obligors with highest credit. In fact, New York State obligations, which have high credit standing, Constitute a large proportion of the total analyzed in determining the basic yields. These bonds are fairly actively traded, are outstan(lirlg in large volume, and cover a complete range of maturities from a few months to 45 years. Bitt the analysis was not limited to New York State issues; bonds of other obligors -those of California, Connecticut, Massachusetts Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Baltimore, New York City, and Bostonwere also included. While the basic yield curves thus derived might almost be regarded as New York State yield-maturity curves because of the prevalence of New York State bonds, they are believed to be reasonably comparable with the basic corporate yield curves.
I-lereafter, in accwd with prevailing masket usage, (lie semi 'flhtiflicipal' is used to (ICcigliare lie sectiriies issued by state and local governments. For the years 1943-47 a basic yield curve was drawn for each of the three months, January, February, and March, based on quotations taken from the Blue List of Current Muiiicipal OfJeriugs, for the middle Tuesday in each month.'° Values taken from these three curves were averaged to obtain a basic yield curve for the (1uartCr. For i the curves drawn for each month of the first quarter were identical, and this was also true for i 945; for 194.4. i q46, and 1947 the monthly curves differed slightly. Chart 2 shows the distribution of bond yields for February 16, 1943 and the basic yield curve, which is identical with that derived for January and for March of that year."
In the analysis of municipal bond yields, the coupon rate of interest was an important factor. Investors apl)arently Ol)ject to paying high premiums, with the result that low coupon bonds selling near iar are pieferred to, and yield less than, high coupon bonds of the same quality and maturity. In some years, the spread in yield for long-term New York State bonds is as much as .50 percent, and a large share of this is attributable to coupon differences. The j)raCUCC of fitting the basi 1 Since inttnkipal buTI(I, arc not traded nit the ouant,cd cshaitcs to :iiR extent. pm e rcwuls of actual sales are dithcult to obtain. 1'Fie Blue 1.1st furnishes prices on an offered itasis oul-. ,vl,ich may be slightly higher than the reali,ed price, but the (liffelCilIC IS SO small that it has little, f any, effect upon the computed basic icid. Moreover, The B/tie list has the great merit of giving quotations on individual maturities of serial issues, which, are most desirable for the anabsis of a market composed mainly of serials.
I The basic ield estimates of nitiniripal obligations for the period l92i--I2. thiscusscil in Chapter 5. are based omi over-tite-counter quotations from The Ban!: ond Onolutiot, Record. For selected maturities monthly closing bid and ask quotations in Jaiiiary. February, and March were avcraged. This method is entirely coitipamahtle wi lit that used in the development of est itna irs of basic corporate bond yields. yield CurVe to the lowesi yield in each Inaulrity cuss means iliat i he curve was hued to the low coupon bonds. Ibis will be oI)Scrvcd in Chart 2, where the basic yield curve has been hued to a Icw scattered bonds with low Coupons, although theic is a hutch more pl'OhlOt!fl(ed clustering of high coupon bonds about v percent higher. ( onseqticiitly, the basic iliunicipal bond yiCl(lS Jmuist he interpreted as the yields of high grade bonds with low COUpons.
The relationsfu1) betwcn yield and (oupoii Iittc is hOt PUliar to the municipal market, although it is particularly pronounced in that market. Ireasury bonds have a rather small variation in the coupon rate and hence a small variation in yield. Corporate bonds have considerable Varialion in coupon rates, but he attendant variation in yield is very difficult to analyze because the yield differential between bonds iiiav be due to quality, (all proviSions, and other factors as well as the coupon rate. But iii the ifltiiiicipal market -where one obligor may have outstanding a number 01 noncaliablc bonds of the same maturity, presumably of the same qualit , and with widely different coupon rates -the effect of coupon upon siehl is suscc1)LibiC to analysis.12 lreasury Bond I ,elds
The basic Treasury bond yield is analogous to the basic corporate aiid the basic municipal bond yields, yet it (lilfers from them in three very important respects. In the first place, the use of the word "basic" is in a sense redundant because there is no quality differentiation among ireasury bonds. 'I'hus, to all intents and purposes, the basic yields may properly be called average Freasury bond yields or simply I'reasury bond yields. Iii the second placc, not one but two basic yield curves had to be computed for this market for i because the market is broken into two distinct segments. One consists of taxable issues; the other includes those that are partially tax-exempt.1 This division did not exist prior to l)e:einber i (4O, when tile taxable issues were introduced into 'l'reasimry offerings; by December i, i q4t they comprised more than 85 percent of the marketable Treasury bonds outstanding. Finally, the basic 'i'reasury yields were (lcrivcd solely froni the analysis of negotiable securities, by which we mean all marketable securities regardless of eligibility for bank investnlent. In the middle of the first quarter of 1946 the negotiable issues constituted approximately 72 percent of the United States government debt. The nonnegotiabic Treasury issues -such as Series E, F, and G have yields and yield curves sharply divergent from those of the negotiable bonds. Only the yields of negotiable 'Freasury issues arc fully COiflf )arablc with the ields of corporate and municipal securities.
The Treasury bond yield curves, which arc familiar because of their use by the Treasury l)epartmncnt'4 are based upon bond priCeS and yields oii S1)CCifiC dates; they are not exactly comparable to the basic corporate bond curves. Iherciore, for the })ICSCtlI study, a new set of Treasury bond yield curves has been computed to show the average yield for the first quarter of each year, 1943-47. This average is derived from the high price and the low price of issues in each of the three months of every quarter.
The Basic Field and the Concept of Pure interest While the basic yield represents an empirical approxiuiauon of a relatively riskiess rate of return on investineni and may therefore be likened to the pure rate of interest of economic theory, certain fundamental differences should be noted. The pure interest rate, which has never been unambiguously defined, includes two primary features -risklessness and uniqueness. Risklessncss implies absolute safety and certainty of principal and interest, including freedom from losses occaSiOflC(l by changes in the general pre level, interest rates, and tax rates. Conse-(juently, an essential prerequisite of riskiessness is the perfect foresight of investors. Uniqueness implies a single fundamental rate underlying the entire structure of interest rates. 'l'his necessarily rests upofl the assuniption that all investors have complete lreC(lom of investment action; that is, arbitrage transactions will be unhampered by legal restrictions, institutional investment practices, brokerage fees, cost of investment analysis and administration, size of bond issue, or any of the other barriers that hinder the flow of investment funds. In this ideal market, all sections would be directly related, and an investment in one section of the market would yield as much as an investment in any other section, after adjustment lor costs and losses. Thus the entire interest rate structure would be based on a single rate --probably the discount rate on riskless short-terni notes -and all other rates would be built up from this. The long-term rate on prime obligations would be an average o the future riskiess short-term rates, and the rate for any but top quality bonds would be divisible illt() two distinct j)arls -the rate for riskless obligations of the same term and a premium to cover the risk of default.
The basic yield, however, implies neither risklessness nor uniqueness. Although it is derived from the yields of the bonds that by current market appraisal are considered to be of the highest quality, these bonds are not entirely riskiess, iior are they so considered by investors. Fhe basic yield reflects the markei 's somewhat uncertain evaluation of the risk of default, howcv sitiall, plus the additional risks resulting from changes in prices, interest rates, taxes, etc.
Obviously, the basic yield is not unique. Investors (10 not COlfll)riSC a homogeneous group, but are divided into many groups of widely varying character Borrowers likewise, arc not a hotiiogeneous group, and the securities they issue differ in many respects. As indicated above, most bonds available for investment in the American bond market fall into three broad categories each of which has (liStiliguishing characteristics: domestic corporation bonds, Treasury bonds, and municipal bonds. This gives rise to three related yet distinct investment markets, in which the basic yield curves differ Shar1)Iy. While arbitrage between the markets exists, it is hampered by many barriers, and, conse(Juefltly, the etnpiricall)1 derived yields in these markets do not reflect the muttcnce 0 identical investment forces.11
15 An explanation of the term structure of interest rates in terms of the institllliotial frainetcorl. within which investment decisions are made has been developed by W. Btaddock Hickman iii his study, The Term Structure of Interest Rates. An understanding of the braid market as consisting f more or less distinct Segments is One facet of this institutional theory.
I 0 THE PATTERN OF BASIC YIELDS, 1943-47 Charts and Tables of the Basic Yield TILE pattern of basic yields for the lirsi (1llarter of each year, 194S-47, is given in Chart . The chart contains four or more yield-maturity curves for each year: one for corporate bonds, one for taxable Treasury bonds, one for partially tax-exempt I'reasury bonds, and one for municipal bonds. The taxable Treasury curve breaks (lown into two distinct parts, one for short-term, bank-eligible issues and one for long-term, bankineligible issues. For i 946 there arc two basic nniiucipal curves, One based largely on New York State issues and comparable to the curves for the other years, the other based entirely on Massachusetts i percent issues; thus the i 946 experience includes six distinct basic yield curves.1 Chart 3 also shows the pattern of yields for i on a logarithmic yield scale. This chart, which points peicentage differences rather than absolute differences, makes the basic yield curves more nearly parallel, but not entirely so. Table t gives the values of these various curves for selected maturities. Values for interme(liatc maturities can be interpolated from the table or read directly from the charts. Fhc values in the table are quoted to the nearest .oi percent, although they are presumably subject to a larger error. For the long-term yields the margin of error may be about .05 percent, and in sonic instances this might be as high as .1 cent. For the short-term yields the error may be somewhat larger -Per-
For all bye years the pattern of basic yields is substantially the same. In every year each yield curve has the same general shape -short-terms yielding less than long. Furtheintore, the different yield curves always bear the same general relationship to one another, although the general levels of the curves and the differences between them vary considerably from yeai to year. The corporate yields are highest and are followed in order by those of taxable Treasury bonds, the partially tax-exempt Treasury bonds, and the municipals. The differences between the cor- Years to maturity .7
.6
.5
.4 I. Based entirely on I percent coupon bonds.
Based on yields to lila) un ty a tid t ernis to lila) ulil V. 1 Based iiii (ellis '.uiitl tenitis to earliest (all (late lot (al lal)IC l)Ofl(IS selling above par.
' l')iese estimates niav entail isiore t han th norutal al000lit of eliot-hci mISC of lalk of a(IC(1 (IflIe data in these maturity ranges.
-Based on bondS lot eligible for commercial latik investment. porate curve and the taxable Treasury curve arc usually sivafl. In 1944, for example, the difference was only . i percent for long-term bonds. Although the difference was largci-in the other 'cars studied, it was always small compared with the difference between 'Ircasury bOndS and municipals. In 1946, for example, 20-year corporates yielded 2.35 percent; 20-year Treasury bonds yielded 2.19 percent; and 20-year Irninicipals yielded 1.00 percent.
Differences Between the Curves
The differences in the levels 0 the various basic yield curves are at Inbutable to the joint influence of a number of forces, for each curve rep. In addition to these characteristic differences between markets, some minor quahiy differentials may still exist even though each basic yield curve represents the highest grade of bonds in its respective market. Treasury bonds, for example, are probably a little more highly regarded than either the best corporates or the best rnunicipals. There may also be a small quality differentjal between the inunicipals and the corporates.
Tax status is probably the most important single factor coiiti-ibuung to the differences in levels of the basic yield curves. For example, the rather spectactilar difference, noted in all years, between the taxable Treasury bond yields and the tax-exempt municipal yiel(1S is largely attributable to the tax privilege, although there are other factois that may have contributed to this difference, including desire for cliversification on ihe part of investors, and the demand-supply situation in Treasuries as compared with municipals. Although the reason for the preferred position of tax-exempt bonds is easy to understand, it is dillcult to explain the amount of the difference. If all incomes were taxed at a hxe(l rate, the differences between fully taxable bond yields and tax-exempt yields should be almost exactly determinable. With a 35 percent general tax rate, lot-example, tax-exempt bonds should yield 65 percent as much as fully taxable bonds, so that the return to the in\restor after taxes would be the same. But actually income tax rates vary Prior to 1938 many corpruate bonds were issued vitli a provision that a 2 v'" income tax would he pain hr the obligor. A few of these are still outstanding. hut the ellen t of this tax exenip. lion is of minor importance.
widely. For individuals the 1916 rates ranged troiii tcro on IIICOHICS of less than $500 to about 90 C1'(Cfl t on incomes iii excess ol S2oo,000. Corporate inComeS, includitig those of commercial banks and liOflhinau cial corporations, during 1946 were subject to federal jIICOIHC tax rates up to 38 percent,4 but during the period of Wartime excess profits taxes the upper limit was consi(Ieral)l\ higher. The lnvcstnlent incomes of many Security holders, such as life insurance Companies, mutual savings iiiStltUtjOflS, and universities are taX-eXclupt or are subject to only a very nominal tax rate.
Clearly, the attra(:[j\'eiicss of the taX-exeniption privilege \'aries considerably from investor to invest01-. With the yield of top grade mimicipal bonds for i 94-47 approxitnalcl}. one-half that of taxable Treasury bon(1s, investors in the lower tax brackets cannot find the tax advan-[ages of high grade lnuluicipals very attractive Coinniei-cjaI banks, even those subject in 1946 to the nlaxiiii urn corporate income tax Fate of 38 percent, could hardly have effecte(j any great tax savings by buying high grade flhttliiCiJ)als on the l)asis of the 1 1)46 yield (hifferentials.5 At the preseu level of tax rates and yield (lifferentials the chief beneficjai-ies of the t:tx-exeni1)tiOfl feature are individuals in the higher income brack,-ts On the basis of i 946 tax rates, benefits could be realized by those with taxable incomes in excess of S20,00o (taxed at the rate of percent or more on the excess over $2o.000).
But interest in municipal bonds is not limited to this small group of high income individuals Lowei-grade municipals with higher yields may have positive tax advantages to some investors who do not find the yields of [lie top grade bon(ls attractive Comn,iierci,1 banks, which arc Permitted to act as dealers in municipals, may derive considerable profit from trading positions as distinct from investment positions. Furthermore, they may invest in local municipal bonds as a form of (oI11munjt service or public relations Finally, Sonic investors who Would HOt 1111(1 the tax advantage in aiiy one year a sufficient attraction may be motivated to buy long-term municipal bonds because of expected increases in taxes.
The call provision also may colitribtite to the (hiffcren(es in levels between basic yield curves, although the effect is certainly less pronounced than that of the tax provision Since most in unicipal bonds are noncallable, they protect the Purchaser against a Possible fall in interest rates. In this they (lifer materially Iromii the Corporates. During Periods of substantial decline in interest rates, a Portfolio of CoI'l)orates is a1t to 1 l)C partly li(1Uidatecl as i result of calls, and reinvestment will almost necessarily be at a lower rate. 'l'reasury bonds occupy an intermediate position for most of theni arc callable a few years before maturity. ComPared with CorporateS and nuni icipals, long-tcrni Treasuries are little flU)FC than mcdium-tci-in bonds. :t this time (1947) the longest term Ireasury 1)011(1 outstanding iiiaturcs iii 1972. 25 years hence, and it is callal)le 111 1q67, 20 years hence. Nevertheless, these bonds offer an assured yield to call for 20 years, and thus provide a hedge against a fall in long-term interest rates. An investor desiring an assured long-term yield might well prefer one ol these bonds to a 40-year callable (oFl)0-rate. The basic yield curves for both the inunicipals and (OrpOrateS are based upon yield to niaturity. Ihis is entirely appropriate for mumcipals, which will presulliai)ly be Paid at maturity. I bough less apl)ropriate for corpol-ates, ii is expedient because of the difficulty of predicting if and when a corporate bond will be called. The basic Treasury curves, however, arc based upon yield to the earliest call (late. The assumption underlymg this procedure is that when 'I'reasury issues are selling above par, as all of them were in the period studied, they will be called at the earl jest opportunity.
The differences between the various basic yield curves often vary with term to nialurity. For example, the difference between corporate and Treasury yields is greatest for the very short maturities. An cxplanation of this plietotueion can be found in the fundamental differences between the two short-term markets. The Treasury market --consisting mainly of bills, certificates of indebtedness, and notes -is a volume market in which the banks Lra(lc actively. This market, furthermore, has been supporte(l by the open market operations of the Federal Reserve System. From Al)ril o. i 942, until July , i the Reserve System operated under a stated policy of supporting bills at /8 j)ercent and (luring much of this period, it was supporting certificates at 7,/s I)eicent. The corporate short-term market, on the (ontrarv. consists mainly of former long-term bonds approaching maturity. The market is not active, and there is no direct sul)l)ort from the Federal Reserve Systcmn.
In the middle-term maturity range. the differences between the orporate curve and the 1 reasury curve have usually been small. The basic corporate yields br 5-to 8-year bondsu ttmally fell below the yields of Treasury securities in the first quarter ob I 944, and they were oniv slightly above the Treasury yields in i q4 and i
In 1q46 and 1 947, however, they were considerably above. This shift, it appears, is closely tied up with the changing pattermi of demand by commercial banks for Treasury bonds. Front late i through most of i q5 new bank pLirchases in the 5-10 year class were relatively slight. Late in i how-'7 ever, and on an increasing scale (luring the list (juarter of i 9.f6 (and also Subsequently) the l)anks (afliC in to make fairly significant new purchases in the -to year class. These small differences in the earlier years are difficult to explain. One pertinenl factor is the volume of high grade corporatc bonds in this range, which is small in comparison with the very large volume of Treasury bonds outstanding. Moreover, this shortage of corponites is aggravated by the habits of some inVestOrs, who hold their bonds to maturity regardless of their inai-kct yield. I'rading activities in this sector are confined mainly to Treasury securities and conse(fu(ently the basic Treasury yields arc piobably much more sensitive to changes in demand than basic corI)orate yields. l'or example, if yields of the actively traded issues decline or increase (luring the second half of the month, and if no sales of the inactively traded SSUCS take place during this period, only the former change in yield is relfccte(l in the basic yield.
The Shape of the Basic held Gurves liic characteristic shape of the basic yield curves for I q43-47, rising at the short-term end and leveling off at the long-term end, has been typical of the yield maturity relation in the American money markets ever since the middle thirties. Since the forces that determine this general shape have been discussed extensively by market analysts, public oilcials, and economic theorists, a systematic treatment of the question is not presented here. A l)riej statement of the Principal contributing forces is in order, however On the practical side, the low level of short-term rates may be attribimied to a Preponderance of demand for short-term securities relative to the supply, which is the result of the volume of excess reserves, the institutional needs of the comnfliercial banks, and the 0licies of the Federal Reserve System. On the theoretical side two explanations have been given for the preponderance of demand for short-ter111 bonds relative to the supply. One is that investors desire liquidity and willingly sacrifice yield in order to obtain it; they therefore bid up the prices of the shortterm issues, relative to the longer_teriui issues. The other is that investors attempt to discount expected future changes in yields. In so doing they bring about a yieldn1aturit) curve in which the long-term yields arc an average of the expected future short-term yields. According to this second view the rising curve indicates that investors must be expecting an increase in interest rates, and that they prefer short-term bonds now so that later thc' can switch into long-tel-rn bonds on more favorable terms.
A complete recoutciliatiomi these two Views is possible if the reles'ant forces are conceived as exerting different influcn('es on Separate gioups of investors. one group, [or exanl1)le -and this includes most o[ the banking system desires liquidity for its own sake, either because of institutional requirements, custom, or considerations of safety. This demand for liquidity may have no relation to any Conscious evaluation of the future course of bond yields. A second group may expect a rise in bond yields and anticipate this rise by buying short-terms .A third group expects a fall and anticipates this fall by buying long-terms. And finally a large fourth group, without any urgent need for liquidity and with no strong convictions about future changes in interest rates, attempts to obtain the highest possible current yield by a suitable arrangement of maturities. As indicated above, another influence of primary importance is that exerted by federal agencies in the management of the pullic (lebt. Therefore, the basic yield curve becomes a see-saw or balance that tips one way or the other, depcn(hng upon the influence of these various groups and the supply of securities of different maturities. Thus the low short-term rate would be properly attributable to the influence of federal debt policy and to the combined weight of the first two groups, those desiring liquidity and those anticipating a rise in yields.
It is worth noting that the shape of the basic municipal yield curve may be affected by the expectation of changes in tax rates, as well as by the desire for liquidity or the expectation of changes in interest rates. If income tax rates or investors' incomes were expected to rise drastically, some investors would buy municipals to protect themselves, and others would buy them as a speculation. For these purposes long-term mumcij)als wouki be preferable to short, and a downward pressure would be exerted on the long-term end of the municipal curve. This pressure would tend to counter-balance the pressure on the short-term end exerted by the desire for liquidity or the expectation of a rise in interest rates: consequently the expectation of higher tax rates would ten(l to make the basic municipal curve flatter than either the taxable Treasury or the corporate curves. Conversely, of course, an expected fall in tax rates would tend to lift the long-term end of the municipal curve.
I 9 THE CHANGING PATTERN OF BASIC YIELDS, \V1IILE CHART 3 gives a good j)iCtIlrc of the pattern of basic icids at a given time namely, the first q lartcr of each of the years i yearly movements cannot be readily detected from it. Charts and have been designed to Overcome this deficiency; they show the changes from year to year in the first-quarter basic yields of corporate and municipal bonds of -vcar, 0-year, and 30-year maturities, and also of Treasury bonds of 3-year, 10-year, and long--terni maturities.' I.imjta/zonc of 1/a' Basic }ze/(f LS1j?)l(1/Cs Full recognition o the limnitatiomis of basic yields is essential in any analysis of these charts. In the first place, basic yields are better adapted to describing the general pattern of rates at a particuJai time than the variation of rates over time. A time series composed of basic; yields for the first quarter of each year depicts the changes in yields that have occurred in that quarter from year to year, but it provides no indica tion of the changes that may have takeii p1ace during the three otIler quarters of the years studied. Au examination of other interest rate series, however, indicates that the trend pi(;turecl by basic yield data does not differ from that obtained from these other measures The basic yield is also subject to the limitation growing out of its derivation from the average of the high and low prices of each month of the first quam-ter, that there may have been a few actual sales of bonds during the quarter at yields slightly lower than the basic yield figure shown.
In the second p1ace, the estimates of short-and lnediummtei-iu yields are subject to aim indeterminable error, which may be quite large in some instances This is due in part to an occasional inadequacy in the number of bonds for which data arc available in sonic particular maturity range, and in part to the use of simple Curves in fitting a basic yield curve. The shoi-t-and mnediumntej-m municipal yields are some-what less i cliable than comparable corporate yields, anl iii turn the corporate yields are somewhat less rclial)lc than short -and med itminterm Freasury bond yields. The long-term yield estimates in all market segments arc thought to be moore accurate than the short-tei'ni. I'or the entire period covered by this study there have been a large number ol high grade municipal and col-I)orale bonds clustering in the 25-to 35-year maturity range. The estimated basic yield for 3o-year bonds has always been superior to estimates of both the short-term and the very long-term yields. lIowever, since the 30-year basic yields are ordinarily estimated to the nearest .05 percent, and Since an error of estimation 01: another .05 l)eCIlt is quite conccivable, the 30-year basic yields are not sufliciently accurate to show minor variations in yield of 02 to .03 !Ct. Comparable data foi 1'rcasimry issues in this maturity range arc lacking, but the long-term Treasury bonds l)ro\i(Ie an accurate meaSUre ot yields in the maturity classes for which such bonds are available.
(;/iaiiges in the Pat(er,i oJ ThLS1C )ields Although the basic yield curves changed considerably during the j)erio(l under review, the tendency was for the relationship among the curves in each segment of the niarket to be similar at aiiy one time (Chart 4). In 926 and 1927 the yield of short-term issues equaled that ol long-terms in each of the three segments -Treasury, municipal, and corporate. In 1929 short-terms wci-e higher than long in all three segments; afl(l SIUCC 1933 yields of long-term issues have been the highest. However, when the three segments arc comlsidere(l in 1-elation to one another, signihcant differences are evident. From i q26 to m qqo, for exarnnle. the normal hierarchy of yields seems to be (orporates highcst, mvnicipals next, Ireasury bonds lowest (Chart 5). Rut during the thn-tics niuiiicipal yields for all except the shortest maturities began to slip below those of Treasury issues, and by i they were clearly lower.
]'he period from about i to i 47 is marked by two (OflSl)1CUOI1S
developments: hrst, a fall in yiCl(IS, and second, a yield curve in which short -tel-ill rates arc consistently below long-term rates. lii fact, the consistency of the low. short-term rate curve (luring the last 5 years has often led to the conclusion that it is the normal curve form. 1926 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '39 '40 '41 '42 '43 '44 '45 '46 '47 1926 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 '36 '37 '38 '39 '40 '41 '42 '43 '44 '45 '46 '47 jb, when the downwatd telidelicy was not proflOLIflce(l lii all Scctot-s of the market; a thir(l in 1947, when basic yields increased for all maturities and all niarkct segments. (Sec Chart .) Betweeii i 92 and t i shon-term basic yields declined more Sharply tIlali long-terni ; furthermore, the decline in basic short-tcrni bond yiei(IS relative to long-term yields was greater in the Treasury bond market than in tile other market segments. This was due, in part, to the Conversion privileges which arose through the Treasury I)Oiic)' Of perlnitting the holder to exchange maturing Treasury obligations for new issues on a l)l'efcrclltial basis. This privilege, in fact, was equivalent to the payment of a premium on the bond at Inatul-ity although the value of this l)renhilImlI could IlOt be predicted exactly. In a(ldition, tiìe grow-'mg excess reserves of the (Olilmercial banking System gave riSe to all increase 111 (leniand for short-term Treasury obligations which was Illore than proportionate to the incre in demand for short-term obligations in other Segments of the market.
After the sharp and conslstent declines from 1992 to 194!. the basic yield series followed no consistent tendency throughout the second period, 194 1-46. Some of the basic yield series actually rose, Some yeinajned relatively stable, and others fell (Charts 4 and 5). Medium-and short-term corporate yields were higher throughout most of the f)eliool than they were in 1940. Short-term Treasury yields rose sharply from 1 940 to 1943 and 1944, largely because of tile volume of new short-ict-in financing and the discnnt !uIancc of the con version privilege, amid then fell off somewhat. Long-tei-ni corporate yields moved (lownward very slowly with no suggestion of an interim rise. The only evidence of a cOntinuation of the downward trend, which was so persistent in the earlier years. is in the municipal market and the Partially tax-exempt Ureasury market, where the tax-exemption privilege exerted a strong downward pressure (lul-ing the period of high war taxes. Long-and inedium_tei-,ii bond yields in both these markets nmovc(l rather sharply (loWUward after a slight rise aroitnd 1942-43. In contrast to the behavior in the preceding periods, basic yields increased in all maturity classes and in all market scglnents in i q7. ,-1 short-and mediuni-terni yields rose more rapidly than the longer-tel-Ill yields. These relatively larger increases in the short-term yields weic clue, in part, to the Treasury policy of retiring palt of the Federal debt. The issues retired were those which were largely owned by the Federal Reserve banks and the commercial banks. Tile effects of this policy upon bank reserves and bank demand for securities in tile shorter-terill market segments more than collnterbaiaiiccd [lie reduction in tile sup-24 iiiy of siiort-tcriii Ircasurv SecuritieS. 111 a(ldition. tile growilig tincertainty in ihe niinds of inan' investors about the continuance Or CXI Ciision ot the wartime interest rate policies followed by the ircasury and the Federal Reserve banks, pan icularly those apj)licai)IC to thC shortterni yickls, retarded the tendency ol the investors iii the short er-term issues to exten(l the maturity of their holdings.
Basic Yields versus Low Grade BO1l(l hells ihe lack of a CoilSiSteIlt downward trend in basic yields from i 94() to 1946 will stand Out in sharp contrast to the experience of many illvestors, who found that both 1)011(1 yields in their port folios and interest itICOInC (leclined consideralily during the j)CriOd. illiS apparelit contra-(lid ion is readily cx1)lained, however, by the prevalence of corporate refimdings and by the fall in yields on low grade bonds. Ihe general ilul)rovelncnt ln crcdjt standings of most companies, the wartime policies ui stabilizing yields of 1'rcasury obligations, and other fiscal policies of the governmnCilt were conducive to \'ery extensive bond ref unding operations. The vohumne of corporate refundings from anuary i, m q4o to 1)ecemnber m, i is estimated to have been in excess 0 $mo. billion; rcliundings were particularly heavy ill 1944, i q45, and the first halt of i q46. IlleSe refundings iflVOlVe(l a substaiitial rc(luction in coupon rates of interest. High coupon bonds matured, were called prior to maturity, or were even bought up in the open market; and they were replaced by new low coupon issues or low-rate bank loans. With the rediiction iii rommnon rates tame an effective reduction in interesi costs to borrowers and in interest ilicolIle to l)ofldlhOl(lerS, both of which were entirely compatible with a stable level of basic corporate yields. Evidently these refunding operations were a process of colTcctiOfl to bring tile COtll)Ofl rates ot interest into line with the basic viCl(IS. }roin 1933 to 940 bond prices rose sharply with an attendant Fall in market yields. There were some refundings to lower coupon rates, but because of the continuOuS (ledline in basic yields, on tile whole, coupon rates relnainc(l well above l)asic yields. But ill I 940, after the lall in basic yields had spent itself, refundings began to bring coupon rates down into line with market yields. For many investors tile decline in market yields meant very little, a long as their portfolios remained inta(;t and their interest income continued as before. They began to be aware of the trend only when the refunding of bonds bought in tile (lays of higher yields began to cut down their income.
As 1946. This change in (1C1)thl is SliO)Wi1 in Charts 7, 8, and g which l)resem the yield distribtitiomi of corporate bonds of all giades in selected maturity ranges in the hrst quarter of 1940, I 946, aiI(1 1947. In (lie colistuiction of these charts a tally was first made of short-term11 bond yields, represented l)y I-to 5-year fliatum-itics: lliediuiiiter,ii bond yields, 8 to I 4 years; and long-term bond yields, 24 to 30 years. '['he Inaturit y ranges had to be made fairly broad in order to include an adequate number of bonds. In making this tally the differcntit1 between the actual yield to maturity of each bond amid the basic yield for bonds of like iiiai urity was taken, amid the bonds were gTotuped iii yield classes according to this An examination of Charts 7, 8, and indicates a considerable decrease in the dispersion, or depth, of bond yields between 1940 and i 946 for each of the selected maturity groups. The lower grade bonds declined in yield more rapidly than the higher grade, and the yields on all bonds tended to concentrate in. a narrowing range above the basic yield. This tendency is sharply evident when an examination is ma(IC of the changes for three maturity groups from 1940 to 1946 in the basic yield, the yield on the bond at the first quartile, the yield on the median bond, and the yield on the bond at the third quartile as shown in Table  2 . In i47 the basic yield rose while the third quartile bond yields for all three maturity groups fell. In other words the yield depth continued to decrease in the first quarter of i even though basic yields moved Quarter, 1940 Quarter, , 1946 Quarter, , and 1947 \Vith respect to this apparent difference in results it should be noted, first, that 'JaNe 2 and (Thart 6 arc not directly comparable because the lOI'iiler is based on a count of individual bond yields, While the latter is an average of bond yields in a given rating grade. Furthej Illore, it iS not P°Siblc to determine whether there is a real conflict in results since the bonds rated Baa by Moody's cannot be identified in 1 able 2. One possible a use of such a conflict is corporate refundings, which might have shifted the position of Baa bonds in the distribtitio, of all bonds.
This discussion ol the period 1940-47 should Illustrate the rather evident Principle thai a comprehensive description of the behavior of intcrest rates during any period necessarily involves a complete treatment of all major types of bonds of all maturities and of all qualities and it may involve an analysis of refunding 0peratioms and coupon ratc5.'i'1 basic yield analysis attempts to give a comprehensire picture of highest grade bond yields only, in which the effects of quality variations are redu( ed to a minjm Flie result is that the basic yield series do no reflect the vei' extens,re movements of the yields of the lower grade bonds. Clearly, any appraisal or interpretation of the basic yield series is more signifidalli ii the movements of the underlying, lower grade, bond yields are also taken into consideration Tn fact, the purpose of the basic yield is to provide a standard of (oltlparisoii against which the movements of all bond yields can be more effect ivelv arialyicd for the high coupon bonds to yield more than the low coupon bonds, these examples are less convincing than the and yield, rather than coupon and yield. Investors seem to be price COflSCiOUS. They tend to prefer bonds selling at discount to bonds selling around par, and the latter in turn to bonds selling at a substantial prc mm. This price consciousness, which results in an appreciable differential in yield, is attributable to a number of factors. These may be grouped into four broad categories: (i) the possil)ihty of redemption prior to maturity: (2) barriers to systematic ainorti/ation of premiums; () expectations of changes in interest rates: () a more or less irrational belief on the part of a few investors that low priced bonds are bargains merely because they are low 1)riced.
In the corporate bond market the possibility of redemption prior to maturity, a very common occurrence, is a real force affecting both prices and yields of premium and discount bonds. Most corporate bonds may be called prior to maturity, at the option of' the obligor, in accordance with the provisions of the bond indenture. Corporates may also be prepaid by court order in the course of a voluntary or involuntary reorganization. In particular, utility holding company bonds may be prepaid in reorganizations ordered by the Securities and Exchange Coinmission in the administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. In these reorganizations the relationship of the liquidation value of the bond to the coupon rate has been one of the troublesome probleins confronting the administrative authorities.
The possibility of prepayment or(hnarily tends to enhance the attractiveness of low 1)riced bonds. A good example of this principle is provided by the Union Pacific Li's and ,'s mentioned in Table 4 . Over the six-year period i 932 to i 937 these bonds varied considerably in price; in i q32 1)0th bonds were selling at discount. and in i 936 and 1937 both were selling above the call price of 107¼. During these six years the 5'S always yielded (in February) more than the 4's, which implies that the 5'S were the more attractive investment. But these yields were computed on the assumption that the bonds would be held to maturity and retired at 1)ar; whereas actually both bonds were retired! on September 1, 1940 at i 07½. It is therefore instructive to examine the yields to actual retirement over the same 1)criod. (These are the yields that w'ere realized by investors 'who bought the bonds in February of each year and held them until September i , i 940.) These yields, tabulated below, show that the 4'S producer! a helter realized return than the 5S.
Although the retirement of these bonds in 1940 could not. have been precisely forecast in i 932, or even in p37, the 1)ossibility of such an outcome was certainly sulhcicnt to give the 4'S an element of sI)eCulattve appeal in periods of low prices, and to render them less likely to produce a loss ' l)eriocls of high prices.
While the prepayment of high grade corporate bonds is a common OCCUITeIICC, the jwepayiiwn of high grade municipal bonds is rare indeed. Most inunicipals are not subject to call, and the possibility o preby court order is remote, especially for the higher grade obligors. It is therefore unlikely that the expectation of 1)repaylfleflt is siillicient to produce an appreciable effect on the I)flC an(l yields of municipal issues. Somewhat related to the possibility ol prepay nt is the possibility of artificial market support. The Federal Reserve System, for example, has the 1)O\VCT to support the Treasury bond market by its open market operations. A feeling among investors and market analysts that the Reserve System would attempt to support the market at par in the event of a rise in interest rates would provide grounds for preferring low coupon Treasury bonds selling near j)ar.
The preference for low priced bonds is at least partly attributable to the accounting problems encountered in rlealmg with bond prem in ins. When a bond is bought at premium, as most o the high grades are in the present market, the I)tlrchascr may choose among three general accounting procedures. First, he may neglect the premium at the time of purchase, which will involve a capital loss or write-off at. maturity (or date of sale). Second, he may write off the preimum at the time of purchase. Finally, he may maintain his capital account intact by any one of several systems of amortization. In effect, the bond })tlr(llaser who wishes to maintain his capital intact at all times must either avoid prerniums or choose the third accounting device -amortization.
Although the present trend of accounting is toward amortization, the practice is far from universal, and there are a number of barriers that prevent it froni becoming universal. It is worth noting thai cross currents and counter forces are sometimes presetit. A trustee, for example, may be prohibited under the terms of the trust from expenditure of capital, evemi to meet energencies; and the purchase o a high I)remnii1n, high coupon bond may oiler a legal loophole to circumvent the prohibition. Or again, security dealers may derive a small advantage From high coupon, tax-exempt bonds. Prior to the Revenue Act of i 1)42, almost any investor could derive an advantage. Since amortization was not allowed, the investor could buy a high premmutim muincipal, enjoy a tax-exempt COU1)Ofl income, and then incur a cal)ital loss for tax itiiposes when the bond matured or was sold. But alter i 942, the average investor was required to amortize his premiums on tax-exempt bonds. 1)ealers in mnunicipals, however, arc still permitted to de(luct pmn1m losses as long as they are merely maintaining a trading position in the market.
Ii is widely recognized that short-tcrnm bomids arc nmre attractive if interest rates are expected to rise and that long-term bonds arc more attractive if interest rates arc expected to fall. It is not SO widely recognizc(l that high COUOfl bofl(lS arc more attractive than low coupon bon(ls of the same immaturity if rates are cxl)ccte(l to rise, and that low' coupon bonds arc more attractive ii ii'itcmCst rates are expected to fall.
:11 illustration is given in lable , which shows the prices of three bonds with coupon rates of . and 5 percent when the rate of return is 1, i /2. and 2 percent to maturity. The table also shows the percentage change in price that would follow from a fall in yields from i ½ to 1 .0 percent and the change that would follow' from a rise in yields from ¼ to 2 percent. For example, the bond sells at Si m.m 7 to yield i . I)erceflt to IllatLirity if the yield should fall to m .o percent the price would rise to Sm 44. i 4, an increase of i 0.99 percent in the market price. The table clearly shows a small but real advantage for tile low coupon bond in a period of falling rates, for the capital gain on the i ½ percent i)Ond is greater than that Oil tile 3 l)ee11t bond, which is ill 37 turn greater than that on thc pCFCIII l)OI1(I. ( onvei-sd, thc high cOupon bonds have a small hut real advantage in a period of rising rates. for the capital loss is less on these bonds. TA8LF 5 F. R. Macaulay has pointed out that a low coupon bond has a longer period of "duration" than a high Coupon bond of the same maturity. 3 The reason is that a high coupon bond sells at a premium that must be amortized out of interest income and this amortization is in effect a repaywezit of principal. For c-xarn1)le a 5 Percent bond ,4 years from maturity should sell at S2,00 1 to yield 1 .5 PelTent to maturity. When the bond is finally rcdeduje(t 371/2 years later, almost exactly one-half of the principal of the investment will have been repaid; only one-half of the original investment remains invested for the entire period. This transaction may be regarded either as an average Investment of about $1,500 for the entire 37 years or, alternativel) as an investme,t of the entire S2,001 for an average period of about 28 years.4 In the 1947 market, characfcrize(1 by lois' short-ten11 rates, high coupon bonds should yield less than low coupon bonds of the same maturity because their "durationS' is shorter, but actually they yield more. This contl-adictiofl is not so real as it appears. Investors who expect a fall in interest rates will prefer long-term bonds in general, and long-term, low coupon bonds in Particular: those who expect interest rates to rise will prefer short-term bonds. Neither group will prefer the long-I ei-m. high Coupon boiids. 4 i hice aJpI ox ima t ions to F lie as ci age cm 0)11111 I nveste(I a ml the a vet age period 01 in vest IncH t ate c.xtIernejv roll gir. \ta(auIIa% dcs ribcs a hId iio I of (Oflipti hug hc avc-F-;ige ditiii ion. hut tire detaik As an explanation 01 the coupon-yield relationship, this analysis of ex1)cctatlon and bond duration is not particularly conclusive. The implications of the analysis are probably not anderstood by enough investors with suflicient funds to affect the market appreciably. Furthermore, ihe possibility of gain from apl)hicatlon of these principles is too limited to warrant much attention from any but the largest investors.
Although a low coupon bond does offer the l)eSt Opportunity for capital gain in a period of falling interest rates, the relative advantage is small.
In 1 able 5 the capital gain (ii .04 percent) on the i percent bond, which results from a tall in yield from 1.5 to 1.0 percent, is very little more than the gain for the 5 percCmt bond (10.90 percent).
The final reason suggested for the market's dislike for hih p'--miunis was a more or less irrational prefereiice for low priced securities merely because they are low pricc(l. This was not intended to iiip1y that some investors choose low priced bonds without regard to their intrinsic value, but rather that nianv investors make decisions based l)a1ly on careful analysis and partly on whim or temperament. Even the most astute and assiduous analyst cannot hope to be entirely rational or completely informed. When a doul)t arises, will the low priced security get the l)CflCfit Ihe forces of investment psychology cannot be ignored. Because of the many valid reasons that make low coupon bonds more attractive under certain circumstances, investors may be led to believe that they are more attractive under other circumstances. If an investor rcalizcs that a low coupon corporate has a clear advantage because of the possibility of repayment, is he not apt to conclude that a low coupon municipal has at least a small advantage for the same reason?
The implications o the coupon-yield relationship to the basic yield analysis and to interest theory in general should not be overlooked.
According to traditional theory any two bonds of different coupon rates but alike in other respects, especially (1ualitv and maturity, should yield the same return.5 In practice. however, this principle clearly does not hold; l)onds selling near are definitely preferred to those selling at a high premium, and conse(Jucntiv they yield appreciably less. Therefore, a realistic discussion of interest rates should specify sonic consistent treatment of coupons. Since the basic yields are computed from the lowest yields of bonds actually traded in the market. they automatically tend to reflect the lowest coupon bonds, which sell at the lowest piemiums. In the ideal analysis, the basic yields would be computed entirely fm-urn bonds wjth coupons just low enough to permit the bonds to sell at approximately par. But over the l)ast fifteen years coupon rates I'crhaps the mat uritv of high coupon bonds should be adjusted in accordance with Macaulay's print iple of duration. The comparison wotIt(1 hen be between I,oiids having the same dur itiOli 1)111 different COUOfl rates.
have not kept pace with the fall iii bout! yields, and most of the high gTa(le issues, from which the basic yields arc dCter,IljflC(J, have sold at a P'' ill IlL Since coupon rates have 1101 always kept pace with yields, the con-1)011-yield relatiolishif) introduces an additional note of lioncomparability into the basic yields for different years. Iii 1946, for example. a Special basic yield curve for i percent lULIliicipal bonds was Computed, based on a single issue of the Conlmnoiiwealth of Massachusetts. But no corresponding i percent bonds were outstanding in previous years, and therefore this special Massachusetts curve docs not seem properly cottiparable with the basic yield curves for earlier years, which were determined from bonds with higher Coupons.
] he pi ohlem of bonds selling at a discoutit has not unite up in this anal sis. If itIteIet t ales ever rise sIIl)StatifialIy so that high grade bonds ate eIliitg at less titan pat, the untpoii. ield rehir ionshi1) ma pr cscit 1 new problems lot a ita lysis.
